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BOOK REVIEW
IMPERIAL APPEAL: THE DEBATE ON THE APPEAL TO THE
PRIVY COUNCIL, 1833-1986. By David B. Swinfen. Manchester
(Lancashire): Manchester University Press, 1987. 268 pp. £35.00.
Reviewed by Richard S. Kay*
Consider the following three, apparently very different, cases.
The Indian Overseas Corporation of Calcutta, India contracted to
sell 21,000 metric tons of salt to Mumtazzudin & Sons of Bangladesh.
The buyer financed the purchase with Atlas Enterprises of Singapore.
When the salt was loaded on the Jag Dhir, the carrier issued bills of
lading to the seller who forwarded them to Atlas, the financier. Atlas,
in turn, endorsed the bills to the Chabbra Corporation. After the Jag
Dhir arrived in Bangladesh, the ship's master improperly released the
goods to the buyer. Chabbra brought an action in admiralty against the
shipowner in the High Court of Singapore. It recovered a judgment but
on appeal to the Singapore Court of Appeals, the amount of damages
was reduced. On further appeal it was held that the Court of Appeals
had erroneously based its damage calculations on the extent of Atlas's
losses instead of on the market value of the cargo. Since, however,
there had been no competent proof of market damages, the award was
upheld.I
Jai Chand met Sheila Maharaj in the shoe factory in Fiji where
they both worked. They moved in together and a child was born.
Maharaj became Chand's defacto wife. In 1973, to provide a home for
his family, Chand secured a long-term lease on property owned by the
Fiji Native Land Trust. In 1980 Chand left Maharaj and the property
but told her she could remain in the house. In March, 1981, however,
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
1. Chabbra Corp. v. Jag Shakti, [1986] 1 All E.R. 480 (P.C.) (Singapore).
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he served her with a notice to quit the premises. In the Supreme Court
of Fiji the trial judge held that Chand was estopped by his prior actions
and representations from denying Maharaj's right to occupy the prop-
erty. The Fiji Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Fiji Land
Trust Act invalidated any "dealing" with interests in the property with-
out the consent of the Native Land Trust Board. On further appeal,
however, the trial court's judgment was reinstated and it was held that
the Act's prohibition did not extend to the kind of personal license cre-
ated by the estoppel in this case.'
Lalchan Nanan was charged with the murder of his wife, Eileen.
He was tried before a jury of twelve in the Supreme Court of Trinidad
and Tobago. When the foreman of the jury was asked whether the jury
had reached a unanimous verdict he replied that they had and that
they had found the accused guilty. Nanan was sentenced to death. The
next day the foreman informed the registrar of the Court that, in fact,
the jury had divided eight to four on the question of Nanan's guilt, that
the jurors had not understood that they all had to agree, and that he
had not known what the word "unanimous" meant. Nanan filed a mo-
tion in the High Court to have the verdict declared invalid. The court
denied the motion holding that it could not consider evidence of what
was said in the jury room. The Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal
affirmed. A further appeal was dismissed in which it was agreed that
the evidence of jury misunderstanding was inadmissible and that, for
the same reason, there could be no proof that Nanan had been deprived
of liberty without due process of law in violation of section 4(a) of the
Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.'
The final judgments on appeal in all of these cases, cases each
originating in a sovereign and independent state, were rendered in the
same court. Each was argued, decided and announced in London by a
bench consisting almost entirely of senior English judges.4 These varied
instances of international adjudication evidence the remnants of the ju-
risdiction of the great imperial court of the British Empire, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. Most observers believe the kinds of
cases described will become increasingly rare and that the judicial
functions of the Privy Council will, like the other artifacts of empire,
eventually disappear. In Imperial Appeal: The Debate on the Appeal
2. Maharaj v. Chand, [1986] 3 All E.R. 107 (P.C.) (Fiji).
3. Nanan v. The State, [1986] 3 All E.R. 248 (P.C.) (Trinidad and Tobago).
4. The judgment in Maharaj was delivered by Sir Robin Cooke, President of the New Zea-
land Court of Appeal.
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to the Privy Council, 1833-1986, David Swinfen has meticulously
traced the decline of the Judicial Committee and the futile attempts to
save or transform it. As is often the case with historical anomalies, it
makes a fascinating story.
Ironically, appeals to the Privy Council from overseas territories
originated in another anachronism. This was the authority of the king
as the source of all justice and his consequent ability to grant relief
outside of and beyond that offered by the regular court system. This
royal authority was exercised in such well-known "prerogative courts"
as the Court of Star Chamber and the Court of High Commission,
which governed ecclesiastical matters. These courts were substantially
abolished with the constitutional settlement of the Seventeenth Cen-
tury, but appeals to the king in council from errors committed by colo-
nial courts were maintained and, in terms of volume of business, just
beginning to assume importance.5 The prerogative nature of the Privy
Council appeals accounts for some of its peculiar features: it always
phrases its judgments in terms of recommendations to the monarch
and, until 1966, did not allow any individual concurring or dissenting
opinions.'
For a long time these matters were referred to an Appeals Com-
mittee of the Privy Council. This Committee had no set procedure, met
irregularly and had difficulty attracting the judicial personnel of the
Privy Council to its hearings and deliberations. Thus cases were some-
times decided by Privy Councillors with no legal training.' As more
and more cases came before the Committee, this informality became
increasingly unsuitable. A major reform was instituted with the enact-
ment of the Judicial Committee Act of 1833.8 That statute created the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which provided for regular
sittings and limited its membership to well-qualified judges.' With the
Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876,10 the membership of the committee
became nearly identical to that of the Law Lords of the House of
Lords.11 The result was a dual appeal procedure in which appeals in
the United Kingdom and those from overseas colonies and dominions
5. D. SWINFEN, IMPERIAL APPEAL: THE DEBATE ON THE APPEAL TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL,
1833-1986, at 4 (1987).
6. See id. at 18-19, 221-22.
7. See id. at 5.
8. 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 41 (1833).
9. See D. SWINFEN, supra note 5, at 3-8.
10. 39 & 40 Vict., ch. 59 (1876).
11. See D. SWINFEN, supra note 5, at 39.
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followed substantively similar but technically different routes of review.
It was, of course, inevitable that, as the former colonies began to
achieve increasing independence,12 the retention of a central appellate
court in London would begin to chafe. Swinfen's account shows how
the question of the appellate jurisdiction of the Privy Council was a
recurring, if not constant, theme in the relations between Britain and
the emerging dominions of the "old" Commonwealth in the period
from the 1870's to the 1930's. While the debate was essentially one of
political status, Swinfen also makes clear that continuation of Privy
Council appeals raised practical problems. These included the expenses
associated with long-distance appeals and the resulting inequality
among litigants with differing resources.
The issue arose in one dominion after another. When the Cana-
dian Parliament created the Supreme Court of Canada in 1875, the
enabling act contained a clause intended to make the new court's judg-
ments final, even as against most appeals to the Privy Council. The
proposal met strong opposition from the legal authorities in London
and the Act was saved from disallowance only by a mutually agreed
upon interpretation that essentially left the appeal untouched.' s Simi-
larly the original draft of the Australian Constitution proposed by the
Australian constitutional convention of 1898 excluded appeals from the
High Court to the Privy Council in constitutional cases. Again the im-
perial authorities, particularly Joseph Chamberlain, the colonial secre-
tary, resisted and forced a compromise resulting in a much narrower
class of constitutional cases being left to the final authority of the Aus-
tralian courts." Not surprisingly the most sustained and dramatic op-
position to imperial appeals arose in that most reluctant dominion, the
Irish Free State. Swinfen gives a detailed account of British resistance
to Irish judicial autonomy even after it was apparently prepared to con-
cede such power to other dominions. This resistance apparently was
caused by a special distrust of the Irish judges' capacity to protect the
interests of the Protestant, Unionist minority."
12. On the decline of the empire see C. CROSS, THE FALL OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1916-1968
(1969); D. JUDD & P. SLINN, THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN COMMONWEALTH, 1902-1980
(1982).
13. See D. SWINFEN, supra note 5, at 28-45. The continuation of appeals to the Privy Council
from Canada had profound and controversial consequences for the developing law on the constitu-
tional distribution of powers between the provincial and federal governments. See P. HOGG, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 373-91 (2d ed. 1985).
14. See D. SWINFEN, supra note 5, at 54-70.
15. See id. at 88-139.
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National sovereignty was bound to prevail. At the Imperial Con-
ference at Westminster in 1926 the Commonwealth was defined as an
association of "autonomous Communities within the British Empire,
equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of
their domestic or external affairs ... ."I And more particularly with
respect to the question of the Privy Council, the report of the Confer-
ence's Inter-Imperial Relations Committee contained the declaration
that "it was no part of the policy of Her Majesty's Government in
Great Britain that questions affecting judicial appeals should be deter-
mined otherwise than in accordance with the wishes of the part of the
Empire primarily affected.""
This policy was given explicit legal effect in the Statute of West-
minster, 1931. The statute did not specifically address the question of
appeals to the Judicial Committee but it made two changes which were
understood to eliminate the legal obstacles to unilateral abolition of ap-
peals by the dominion parliaments. First it repealed the Colonial Laws
Validity Act of 186518 insofar as it applied to dominion legislation, al-
lowing the dominion Parliaments to pass statutes in conflict with acts of
the Westminster Parliament. Second it empowered the Dominions to
create legislation with extra-territorial effect, thus reaching appeals in
the United Kingdom.1 9 Canada and the Irish Free State took almost
immediate advantage of this power with Ireland abolishing the appeal
in 1933,20 and Canada abolishing it in criminal cases in the same
year.2
16. E. WADE & A. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 421 (10th ed.
1985) (quoting W. DALE, THE MODERN COMMONWEALTH 21 (1983); CMND. No 2768, at 14
(Imperial Conference - Summary of Proceedings) (1926)).
17. D. SWINFEN, supra note 5, at 118 (quoting CMND. No. 2768, at 19 (Imperial Conference -
Summary of Proceedings) (1926)).
18. 22 Geo. 5, ch. 4 (1931). The Colonial Law Validity Act is found at 28 & 29 Vict., ch. 63
(1865).
19. See D. SWINFEN, supra note 5, at 88. These obstacles had been identified in a Privy Coun-
cil case holding invalid an earlier attempt of Canada to abolish appeals in criminal cases. Nadan
v. The King, 1926 App. Cas. 482 (P.C.) (Can.).
20. Even after the enactment of the statute, a legal question continued as to whether abolition
of the appeal by the Irish Free State was inconsistent with the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. The
abolition legislation was held valid in Moore v. Attorney General, 1935 A.C. 484 (P.C.) (fr.).
Both the legal and political aspects of the abolition of the Irish appeal are dealt with by Swinfen.
See D. SWINFEN, supra note 5, at 116-26.
21. See id. at 136. Civil appeals were not abolished until 1949, R.S.C. 1949, Second Session,
ch. 37, §§ 3, 7, because of doubts about the relative authority of federal and provincial legislatures
which were resolved in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada, 1947 App.
Cas. 127 (P.C.) (Can.).
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Elsewhere, however, the countries of the "old" Commonwealth
were in less of a hurry. South Africa did not act until the Nationalist
party assumed power in 1950.2 In Australia the appeal was restricted
but no action was taken to abolish it until 1975, when appeals from the
High Court were ended.2 3 Because of domestic political and legal ques-
tions, appeals from the state courts were not abolished until 1986, and
then only with the help of legislation from the Parliament at Westmin-
ster. 4 Although its abolition has been the subject of discussion,2 the
appeal continues intact in New Zealand. 6 Countries of the "new"
Commonwealth, on the other hand, have often abolished the appeal im-
mediately upon independence 27 or upon adopting a republican form of
government. 8 Although the retrenchment of the Judicial Committee's
jurisdiction has been neither rapid nor regular (as the examples cited at
the beginning of this review show), it appears to be inexorable.
The decline of the judicial functions of the Privy Council presents
an interesting case study in the fading of colonialism and Swinfen gives
a careful and thoughtful account of the political tugs and tussles that
accompanied that process. The same story, however, may exemplify a
somewhat more general issue, one with continuing relevance to live le-
gal and political controversies. The giving way of the great court of the
empire may be examined as a microcosm of the difficulties of creating
or maintaining any broad system of international adjudication.
In summarizing Swinfen's account of the gradual elimination of
appeals to the Privy Council, I have dealt only with half of the subject
matter of Imperial Appeal. Equally prominent is his description of the
repeated attempts, occurring over almost exactly the same period, to
replace the Judicial Committee with some other imperial or common-
wealth court. That is, as the old system disintegrated, many judges and
statesmen in Britain and other parts of the Commonwealth argued
against abandoning this kind of legal connection. Various reasons were
given. To some, no doubt, the desire stemmed from a mere sentimental
22. D. SWINFEN, supra note 5, at 160. South Africa had, in fact, held the power to abolish
appeals since its creation as a dominion in 1909. See id. at 101.
23. Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act, No. 33 (Austl. 1975).
24. Australia Act, 1986, ch. 2.
25. See, e.g., Burns, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: Constitutional Bulwark or
Colonial Remnant, 5 OTAGO L. REv. 503 (1984).
26. See D. SWINFEN, supra note 5, at 167.
27. See, e.g., Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, Constituent Assembly, No. 5 (India
1949).
28. See D. SWINFFN, supra note 5, at 167-72.
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attachment to the Empire.29 A more practical consideration, which
probably maintains some influence, is the perceived paucity of legal tal-
ent, especially in the developing countries of the "new" Common-
wealth, and the difficulty of assembling a sufficiently qualified appellate
court. 0 But for others the maintenance of the Privy Council appeal
was a means of strengthening a worthwhile link among legal systems
that shared certain cherished assumptions and values, usually referred
to as a common heritage of the "rule of law".31 This idea was con-
nected with a vision of the Commonwealth as a league of independent
states committed to certain overriding principles - that is, as an inter-
national organization.
Naturally these proposals did not seek to maintain the Judicial
Committee in exactly the form in which it had existed. It would have
to be modified to eliminate the artifacts of colonialism. The predomi-
nance of British judges would have to end. The manner of selecting the
judges would have to be shared among the various member nations.
The Court itself would probably have to be peripatetic, sitting in vari-
ous parts of the world, perhaps in regional benches.
The persistence of proposals of this kind is remarkable especially
in light of their continued failure to be taken seriously. The possibility
of a new court was raised as early as 1900 by Joseph Chamberlain
(with some assistance by R.B. Haldane, later a prominent Law Lord
and member of the Judicial Committee) in response to Australian re-
sistance to maintaining the Privy Council appeal.3 2 It appeared again
in 1929 during the debate on the abolition of the appeal from the
courts of the Irish Free State. This time it was suggested that a Com-
monwealth tribunal be established, not to entertain general appeals
from local courts, but to resolve disputes among the members of the
29. In 1875, when the Liberal Government in Canada introduced in the Canadian Parliament
its Supreme Court Act eliminating appeals to the Privy Council, the leader of the Conservative
opposition, former Prime Minister John A. MacDonald, denounced it: "Those who disliked the
colonial connection spoke of it as a chain, but it was a golden chain, and he for one was glad to
wear the fetters." D. SWINFEN, supra note 5, at 30 (quoting Debates of the Dominion Parliament,
980-81, 23 February 1875).
30. See id. at 213.
31. See, e.g., id. at 211-13.
32. See id. at 62-64. The same proposal was renewed by the Australians themselves at subse-
quent Imperial Conferences in 1907, 1911, and 1918. See id. at 68-73. Swinfen says that "[o]ne
may very well doubt whether, apart from Australian championship and the single, hastily with-
drawn offer from Chamberlain, the issue had ever been alive. From 1901 onwards, the attitude of
Britain and of the other Dominions was at most apathetic and usually frankly hostile." Id. at 73.
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Commonwealth. Even this restricted proposal raised little enthusiasm. 3
A flurry of proposals appeared in the 1960's and were supported by
prominent legal officials in Britain. It is no coincidence, as Swinfen
notes, that these plans were raised simultaneously with the debate on
the entry of the United Kingdom into the Common Market. The Com-
monwealth was regarded by opponents of that step as a natural inter-
national alternative.14 None of these proposals, no matter how earnestly
pressed, came close to being enacted.
To some extent the obstacles were practical. A London-based
court would smack too much of colonialism and would remain remote
and hard to deal with in the rest of the Commonwealth. A traveling
court or regional benches would create enormous logistical problems
and expense.3 5 Support in Britain was hampered by the recognition
that, if the adhering states were really to be on an equal level, the new
court would have to replace, or hear appeals, from the House of Lords.
Although some proponents accepted this possibility in the 1960's, it
was a prospect which many British lawyers could not stomach. 3 But
this reluctance exemplifies the more profound flaws in the suggestions
for a Commonwealth court; their failure to account for attitudes to-
ward law present not only in Great Britain, but in the rest of the Com-
monwealth as well.
Continuation of any form of an international Commonwealth court
was doomed because it was inconsistent with new, prevailing assump-
tions about the nature and sources of law. The same difficulties, there-
fore, are bound to beset any attempt to establish an international court,
that is, one in which judicial personnel from without are empowered to
adjudicate rights and liabilities within an effective national legal sys-
tem. The arguments for a reformed Commonwealth court were usually
fairly vague, most often stressing the desirability of maintaining the
link of empire. But the proponents necessarily presupposed certain
common beliefs about the kind of law that such a tribunal would apply.
Most often those beliefs were phrased no more specifically than by ref-
33. See id. at 102-13. Most of the larger Commonwealth countries had entered reservations to
their adherence to the treaty creating the International Court of Justice in 1929 excepting dis-
putes with other members of the Commonwealth. This was, at least on the part of Britain, partly
to forestall litigation at the Hague involving the status of Ireland under the Anglo-Irish Treaty of
1921. Id. at 199.
34. See id. at 185-86.
35. See id. at 196-97, 201-06.
36. See id. at 67-68, 78-79, 183-84. Later proposals conceding that British appeals would have
to be included in the new court's jurisdiction are discussed in id. at 187-218.
[Vol. 4:239
BOOK REVIEW
erences to the "rule of law," a concept extravagantly praised 7 but
rarely defined. Some advocates referred especially to the shared attach-
ment to the common law, 38 an outlook which ignored, for example, the
Islamic law of Pakistan 9 or the civil law of Quebec.4 1 It was imagined
that the Commonwealth court would draw on the best legal talent
available, that its judges would be world-class experts in the interpreta-
tion of law.4 But that also presupposed the existence of some body of
knowable material, something in which the judges might be expert. In-
deed, one finds among the statements of those favoring the creation of
the new court arguments based on the need for one "wisest single expo-
nent of scientific law."" 2
Looking back from our viewpoint at the end of the century, these
attitudes appear fundamentally, if touchingly, naive. In connection with
any form of international adjudication, they necessarily entail the un-
stated assumption that some kind of binding law exists independently
of the law-making authorities of the states in which it is applied. But
we can now see that by the time these expressions were being uttered,
the view of law on which they were based had been irretrievably lost.
That is, positivism had carried the day. Justice Holmes's response to
the contrary view on the nature and sources of the common law sum-
marizes the now prevailing view:
It is very hard to resist the impression that there is one august
corpus, to understand which clearly is the only task of any
Court. ... But there is no such body of law. The fallacy and
illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that there is this
outside thing to be found. Law is a word used with different
meanings, but law in the sense in which courts speak of it to-
day does not exist without some definite authority behind it.
37. See, e.g., id. at 198 (quoting Senator Cooray of Ceylon telling the 1960 Prime Ministers'
Conference in London that the rule of law was "the finest legacy which Great Britain has left to
the many countries she has nurtured into independence." Cooray, A Commonwealth Court, 1962
J. PARLIAMENTS COMMONWEALTH). See also id. at 196, 211.
38. See id. at 196, 212-13.
39. See id. at 214 (discussing remarks of Pakistani delegate to Sydney Commonwealth Con-
ference of 1965).
40. See F. SCOTT, ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 32 (1977). Ironically, much of the support
within Canada for maintaining the appeal to the Privy Council came from Quebec where some
people saw it as a protection of minority rights within the dominion. See D. SWINFEN, supra note
5, at 107.
41. See D. SWINFEN, supra note 5, at 191, 212-13.
42. Id. at 181 (quoting speech of Hector Hughes in the House of Commons on November 3,
1953).
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The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether
called common law or not, is not the common law generally
but the law of that State existing by the authority of that
State ....
Adopting this view, the idea that the law of an independent state could
somehow be discovered by expert, scientific judges poring over ancient
books in a court thousands of miles away was, at some level, preposter-
ous. Even with respect to enacted law, modern jurisprudence has come
to believe that interpretation is at most a subjective and at least an
imprecise process"' and that the authority that makes any interpreta-
tion controlling must be authority vested by the state in the Court that
pronounces it. Making law in general, and adjudication in particular,
has come to be seen as an inseparable attribute of sovereignty.", The
nature of the Commonwealth as an association of sovereign states had
been irreversibly settled in the 1920's and 1930's. It followed that mak-
ing law for each state was within the authority of that state alone and
it was unlikely that such an essential power was about to be delegated
to some international panel of "experts." '46
It seems clear that exactly the same dilemma attends the persis-
tent, yet only partially successful, attempts to create new forms of in-
ternational adjudication. It is, therefore, no surprise that the jurispru-
dence of international law has been decidedly unsympathetic to legal
positivism and is, indeed, one of the last bastions of "natural law"
thinking.17 To that extent, it denies what seems to be an axiom of the
modern understanding of law - that legal systems and law-makers are
logically, if not always historically, prior to law. We recognize law as
the creation of human beings, who for one reason or another, are re-
43. Black & White Taxi Cab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi Cab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
44. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 122-24 (1960).
45. This fundamental difficulty surfaced regularly in the debates on the proposals for a Com-
monwealth Court of Appeal. See, e.g., D. SWINFEN, supra note 5, at 214-15 (quoting remarks of
Chief Justice Gajundragadkar of India at the Commonwealth Law Conference in Sydney in
1965).
46. Thus the proponents of a Commonwealth court were sometimes torn between their desire
for judicial quality and their recognition that the choice of judges would, at least in part, have to
be in the hands of the various political authorities. See id. at 202-03.
47. See, e.g., Kunz, Natural-Law Thinking in the Modern Science of International Law, 55
AM. J. INT'L L. 951 (1961); Walsh, Commentary, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 381 (1987). For a discern-
ing examination of the difficulties of reconciling much international law with positivism, see Janis,
Individuals as Subjects of International Law, 17 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 61 (1984). See also M.
JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 163-69 (1988).
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garded as legitimate sources of law. What constitutes legitimate
sources must be a political and, therefore, a time and place-bound mat-
ter.4 8 For law-making power of the broad and strong kind that is
sought for international tribunals, those sources have, for a long time,
been almost invariably identified with the state.49
This is not at all to say that an international system of adjudica-
tion is impossible. We have many examples to the contrary. But so long
as the state remains the principle source of law we have to expect the
authority of such international tribunals to be conferred by those states.
So long as the political authorities in the states continue to sanction
such international law-making it will be an effective source of law. It
will, in those circumstances, be sensible to regard it as the exercise of a
delegated power. But, if social and political conditions are right, such a
court and the sources of law on which it relies may come to be ac-
cepted as legitimate in their own right, and a new and independent
legal system will have come into being. Something like this may be
happening now in Europe with respect to the law of the European Eco-
nomic Community"0 and the protection of human rights under the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights. 1 Perhaps we can now look back
at the creation of a single federal legal system in the United States in
the same way.52 The development of such a new legal system will occur
48. The criteria for recognition of a legitimate law-maker can be complex and imprecise. But
those criteria are prior to law and can usefully be regarded, at least by the external observer, as
not themselves rules of law. See H. HART, supra note 44, at 107-08.
49. This does not mean that it is useless to talk of non-state created law. That may be a
helpful way of explaining the attitudes and behavior connected with various forms of non-state
("private") associations. These other legal systems may exist within the jurisdiction of a state
legal system sometimes conflicting with, but often coexisting with, the state system. See Weisbrod,
Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutional and Religious Authority, 27 J. FAM. L.
- (1988). In the same way, we could have a transnational or international legal system coexist-
ing with the domestic state systems. But to call any of these phenomena systems of law, some kind
of acceptance of the legitimacy of the law-maker must exist within the relevant population. See
infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
50. See Jones, The Legal Nature of the European Community: A Jurisprudential Analysis
Using H.L.A. Hart's Model of Law and Legal System, 17 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1 (1984).
51. See Conference on International Courts and the Protection of Human Rights, 2 CoNN. J.
INT'L L. 261 (1987). Another way of stating this critical transition is to identify the point at which
national compliance with internationally created rules ceases to be a matter of policy and becomes
one of perceived obligation. See H. HART, supra note 44, at 79-88.
52. Whether or not the United States was merely the delegate, for limited purposes, of the
individual states might be thought to have remained an open question until the Civil War. Cer-
tainly the states' rights arguments of the antebellum period and the justifications for secession
assumed that ultimate and supreme law-making power was in the states. See H. HYMAN & W.
WIECKEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 211-13
(1982).
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only when broad political agreement emerges both as to substantive
values informing the lawmaker and the quality of the lawmaker itself."
To support some form of international legal system, such agreement
must override the modern predisposition to suspect any kind of author-
ity originating outside the boundaries of the nation-state.
Given these criteria, the failure of the plans to establish a Com-
monwealth legal system appears to have been inevitable. Those propos-
als consisted of attempts to forge a political attitude that valued inter-
national legal authority at the very time national sovereignty and
independence were the dominant political ideas in the societies which
would be affected. All of the talk about a common legal tradition and
heritage was nothing in comparison with the centrifugal political forces
of that period. The nations of the Commonwealth did, indeed, share a
common history and experience. But it was the history and experience
of colonialism, a legacy unlikely in the 1960's to provide the kind of
foundation on which a new system of law might rest. The transnational
attitudes required to create such a system must be rooted in beliefs
which can prevail, at least within some limited area, over the social
conviction that no outsiders have the wisdom or right to make law. The
Privy Council and the Commonwealth Court of Appeal could draw
only on values which were everywhere being rejected.
53. See Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONST. COMM. 57, 60-61 (1987).
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